We assess the impact of low skilled immigration on firms' investment decisions. We first present a simple partial equilibrium investment model characterized by asymmetric information on workers' skills and central bargaining and show that firms are likely to react to the quality downgrade of their workforce due to immigration by accumulating more production capital. This result is empirically confirmed on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms over the period 1996-2007: firms' investment rates in machinery increase in response to immigration from developing countries. This effect is stronger for large and less technologically advanced industries and it holds confirmed after a number of robustness checks.
Introduction
The rapid growth of world population, geo-political changes, the persistence of wide gaps in income and the diverging population trends in the last twenty years have led to an increase in the number of people migrating from developing and emerging economies to advanced ones. At the start of this decade, there were around 85 million people living in the OECD countries who had been born abroad, three times as many as 40 years earlier. A significant part of the recent migration flows have originated from China, India, Russia, and central and eastern European countries.
Immigration from developing areas raises serious concerns in advanced host economies, ranging from labor market outcomes to public finances. The attention of academic scholars and policy makers on the absorbing capacity of an economy has been consequently growing fast (Borjas, 1994) . Most of the studies focused on the impact of low-skilled immigrant workers, seen as a true supply shift, on natives' wages and employment (see Okkerse, 2008 , for a recent and comprehensive review).
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of unskilled immigration flows on the technological decisions made by Italian firms. Italy is an interesting case as it has registered a recent and exceptional increase in low-skilled immigration. In 2008 there were 3.4 million resident foreigners, about 6 per cent of the resident population against less than half in 2003 and a much lower 1 per cent in 1991; according to OECD (2007) , Italy ranks now third (after US and UK) among the main destinations of migration flows. 1 Thanks to the availability of a very detailed dataset, we focus on the effects of an increase of foreign population on investment in machinery. We first present a simple partial equilibrium investment model, in which workers' productivity is heterogeneous, firms do not observe it, but, on average, foreigners are less productive than natives. We also assume that wage setting by firms is characterized by some degree of rigidity. We show that, under some parameter restrictions, manufacturing firms tend to accumulate more capital in response to the quality downgrade of their workforce due to immigration. This result is confirmed by Italian data on investment by manufacturing firms in the period [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . In particular, we show that, controlling for endogeneity issues, investment rates rise in response to immigration by less developed countries. This finding is robust to a number of checks and it is stronger for large and less technologically advanced firms.
International evidence on the effects of immigration on native workers is extremely rich. For the US these studies have produced mixed results: from a positive effect due to complementarity between natives and migrants Peri, 2006, 2008) , to no effect (Lewis, 2004; Card, 2007) , to a negative effect for na- 1 The arrival of such large inflows was quite surprising in a period in which the Italian economy experienced the longest slowdown in the post-war period. On the basis of National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) data, at the start of 2008, almost half of the foreigners legally resident in Italy came from central and eastern European countries, mainly Albania and Romania (11.7 and 18.2 per cent, respectively); about a quarter came from the African countries in the Mediterranean basin, and 16 per cent came from Asia. Compared with the main European countries, foreigners (legally) residents in Italy are younger and less educated. Over the period 2005-07, the median age for those older than 16 years was 38, against over 50 in Germany and France. Among those with age between 25 and 55, about half has, at most, an educational level corresponding to the end of compulsory schooling, while only 14 per cent have a university degree (in the EU15 the corresponding average figures are 32 and 36 per cent).
tives (Borjas et al., 2008) . In terms of wages, the most recent assessments indicate that recent low-skilled immigration flows slightly raised the average remuneration of the residents in advanced economies, but modestly reduced that of less skilled job, where competition from immigrants is stronger. 2 The available empirical evidence on Italian data confirms the absence of a displacement effect on natives. Gavosto et al. (1999) show that an high share of foreign workers in the labour market is associated with an increase in native blue-collar workers' wages in the period 1990-95. According to the authors, this complementary effect is due to an imperfect matching between workers' skills and firms' job requirements. Immigrants fill the gap, giving especially small companies the opportunity to expand the production, otherwise constrained by labor supply. Venturini and Villosio (2006) show that immigration does not seem to have displaced natives working opportunities (i.e. unemployment rate); recently, Mocetti and Porello (2009) assess the impact of immigration on natives' internal migration decisions and find that massive immigration causes a displacement for unskilled individuals while it generates complementarities with skilled ones. Other studies focus on native-immigrants wage gap: Brandolini et al. (2005) find that there is a statistically significant wage differential between these two groups and it can be mostly accounted for the fact that immigrants usually work in less-productive firms, whose salary level is already quite low. A similar result is found by Venturini and Villosio (2000) and Venturini and Villosio (2002) who analyze both salaries and tenures. The analysis of the determinants of immigrants' wages in Italy is much less explored due to the lack of adequate datasets; among the few notable exceptions, Baldacci et al. (1999) and Accetturo and Infante (2009) estimate that immigrants' returns on schooling, though positive, are significantly smaller than those of Italians with similar characteristics. However, the process of integration and assimilation seems to be fast enough.
This paper relates to a more recent stream of literature aimed at assessing the changes in the production structure due to immigration at the sector-or firm-level. The basic idea is that an exogenous immigration-induced increase in the availability of low-skilled workers causes a shift toward more low-skill-intensive productions: this might occur with a reallocation of resources towards sectors that make a more intensive use of such workers (between sector effect) or towards firms whose technology requires more of these workers (within sector, between firm effect) or at the firm-level with a shift toward productions or technologies that are more intensive in low-skilled workers (within firm effect). Dustmann and Glitz (2007) provide a precise decomposition of such adjustment mechanisms.
Empirical evidence rejects quite neatly the between sector hypothesis. 3 Lewis (2004) for the US, Dustmann and Glitz (2007) for Germany, and Gandal et al. (2004) for Israel find no significant change in the output mix in response to a greater availability of immigrants. Interestingly, this result holds for both skilled (in Israel) and unskilled immigration (US and Germany).
The within sector hypothesis is similar in nature to the Skill Biased Technological Change argument (SBTC, Acemoglu, 2002; Green, 2003, 2005) . As innovatively conjectured by SBTC literature, technical change may partly be an endogenous response of firms to the greater availability of more-(less-, in the immigration case) educated workers. Looking at low-skilled Mexican immigration in the US, Lewis (2004) and Card and Lewis (2005) show that most of the increases in the relative supply of low education labor has been absorbed by changes in skill intensity within narrowly defined industries. According to Gandal et al. (2004) , the high-skilled Russian immigration had an analogous effect, but of opposite sign, in Israel with a shift toward more skill intensive productions.
Firm-level evidence on this is provided by Lewis (2005) and Dustmann and Glitz (2007) . Lewis (2005) find a negative impact of low-skilled immigration in US metropolitan areas, used as instrument for high school dropouts, on the use of automation technologies. In other words, US firms "downgrade" their technologies when the relative supply of low-skilled workers (exogenously) increases. Using a German matched employer-employee dataset, Dustmann and Glitz (2007) suggests that the technological adjustment is due to the within firm component: factor intensities, indeed, shift toward a relative more intense use of low-skilled workers. This effect is mostly due to firms in tradable industries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next three sections subsequently illustrate the theoretical model, the empirical specification and the data, respectively. Section 5 presents the results. The last section concludes.
The theoretical model
In this section we provide some theoretical guidance to the empirical analysis. We present a simple partial equilibrium model in which migration is able to influence firms' incentives to accumulate capital. We assume that firms operate under constant return to scale and face a downward sloped demand schedule to ensure that factor demands are determined in a closed form solution. A particular attention is also placed on the labor market characteristics. We suppose that both immigrants and natives workers are heterogeneous in their productivity levels, but, on average, firms expect that aliens are less skilled than natives. As it will be clear, a crucial hypothesis to obtain our results is that labor market is imperfect and wage setting is characterized by some degrees of rigidities due to central bargaining.
Market demand and firm equilibrium
Suppose that firms face the following isoelastic demand curve:
where D is the usual shift parameter, p is the price and α > 1 represents the price elasticity to demand.
Standard profit maximization yields
where c is the firm marginal cost, Y * and π * represent, respectively, equilibrium production and profits and ξ = α α (α − 1) 1−α .
Labor market
Suppose there are two types of labor: immigrant and native. We assume that each workers is characterized by her own productivity that cannot be observed by the firm before hiring. However, for a given job, firms know that immigrant workers are, on average, less productive than natives. In particular, vacancy-specific individual productivities are randomly drawn from the following Pareto distributions:
Where b N > b F are the scale parameters and ε > 0 is the shape of the distributions. In what follows, we normalize b N = 1. Equations (5) and (6) have the classical implications of a Pareto distribution: for a given job, the probability to find a smart and productive worker (regardless her origins) is lower than the one to find an unskilled one. Moreover, individual productivities for aliens and natives are randomly drawn from two different distributions: the probability to find a skilled migrant is lower than the one to find a native with the same characteristics. This does not mean that highly productive immigrants are impossible to find, they are just rarer than natives. In the remainder of the paper, we assume that firms cannot observe the individual productivity before hiring but they know that individual skills are drawn from either equation (5) if the worker is native or equation (6) otherwise. This plays an important role in the firms' expectations about average productivities and costs. In particular, expected individual productivities are as follows:
Wage setting by firms mirrors the mixed Italian bargaining process in which both central and firm level bargaining coexist. In Italy, trade unions, associations of entrepreneurs and the central government agree on a unique nation-wide minimum wage (definedw in the model). In the model, we assume that individual firms are too small to control this process, so that they take it as given. Then there is a second-tier bargaining at firm level between entrepreneurs and individual workers. Firms may decide to pay some extra bonuses to their more skilled workers. In the model we introduce this mechanism as follows. After hiring a worker, firms can observe her productivity and decide whether to give her a bonus which amounts to η − 1 times the minimum wage. For simplicity, we can assume that firms set a productivity threshold b T : for all worker whose productivity exceeds b T , total income will be equal to ηw; for all the remaining ones income will amount to the minimum wagew. By using equations (5) and (6), this implies that a share ( 1 b T ) ε of native workers receive the bonus. Symmetrically, the share of immigrants with a wage above the minimum is (
, that is lower than the one for natives. 4
Let us now turn to the firm-level natives/immigrants mix. Let β be the share of immigrant population within each city. We suppose that firm level natives/immigrants composition perfectly mirrors the local labor market one and, thus, β also indicates the share of foreign workers within each firm. This simplifying assumption may be justified by the fact that workers are heterogeneous and employers cannot discriminate only on the basis of the country of origin (i.e. hiring a foreigner does not imply that her productivity is deterministically below a native's one). Moreover, by assuming the existence of sizeable search costs, we ensure that firms' mix should not be too different from the local market one since, in a non discriminating environment, applications should reflect the same natives/immigrants composition of active individuals in the labor market.
Under these assumptions, the average labor cost will be equal to:
Note that despite the assumption of a semirigid labor market, with no discrimination and central bargaining, this model displays the interesting feature that ∂Φ ∂β < 0, i.e. the average labor cost declines with the share of immigrants, since as long as firms hire more immigrants they usually pay less productivity bonuses.
Technology and capital accumulation
We now turn to the core of this section and describe technology and the process of capital accumulation. Firms' production function is as follows:
(1 − β) + βb F represents the average labor skill within a firm that can be easily obtained by using equations (5) and (6). It is easy to show that ∂B ∂β < 0, that is the larger the share of immigrants, the lower the average skill within a firm. σ represents the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital and A is the usual total factor productivity (TFP) at the firm-level. Classical cost minimization problem leads to the following marginal cost function:
c =w Φr
By plugging equation (10) into the equilibrium production levels (equation (3)), and deriving factor demands, we obtain:
Equations (11) and (12) represent the equilibrium capital and labor employed by a profit maximizing firm. Both demand (D) and TFP levels (A) have a positive impact on the equilibrium factors demands; as usual for this class of production function, factor demands are downward sloped, while equilibrium condition requires that factors are substitutes (i.e. σ > α).
We now turn to firms' investment decision. Before focusing on the algebra, it is useful to analyze the economics of the model. In this setting, a firm's equilibrium capital demand depends on average skills and wages. These two parameters are crucially determined by migration flows: in particular, immigration determines both a downgrade of labor productivity and a decrease in the average wage. In this setting we neglect all possible credit market issues: since we control for credit market availability in the empirical part, we do not need to make the model more complex than necessary. In order to determine under which conditions migration induces capital accumulation, we first start analyzing the evolution over time of equation (11). By taking logs we obtain:
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we also assume that there are no adjustment costs, which we cope with in the empirical part. All prices, demand and technological parameters (i.e. A, D, α, r,w and γ) are assumed constant over time, while firms face an exogenous inflow of unskilled immigrants. By taking the derivative of equation (13) with respect to time, we find the equilibrium dynamics of firm level capital:
whereβ represents the time dynamics of the share of immigrants. Equation (14) is positive if and only if
This means that firms increase their investment rates in response to migration if and only if the percentage variation in labor cost is higher (i.e. is smaller in absolute terms) than the percentage change in the average skills of workers. In other words, wages should be stickier than productivities. The mechanism works as follows: when the economy experiences an inflow of migrants, both average wages and skills decrease in response to the lower (expected) productivity of migrants. When wages react less than productivity, entrepreneur compensate the decreased efficiency of their labor force by providing workers with more capital. It is now apparent the crucial role of labor market imperfections in this model: the larger (or smaller) accumulation is linked to the fact that the co-movement of wages and skills is not perfectly symmetric.
We can now state the mathematical solution for this condition:
This condition shows that average wages react less than average productivities if and only if the size of the bonus (η) is comparatively small. This implies that the wage gap between skilled (i.e. b > b T ) and unskilled (i.e. b < b T ) workers is small enough and, therefore, migrants' inflows create a negligible decrease in the average wage.
The empirical model
In this section we test the predictions of our partial equilibrium theoretical model. For this, we start from the empirical counterpart of equation (14), that is:
5 Recall that σ > α.
where i indexes firms, j the provinces where firm i is located, and t is time. The dependent variable g k ijt ≡ I ijt /K ijt−1 is the growth rate of production capital gross of depreciation computed as a firm's investment rate in machinery (that is, the ratio between investment at time t, I ijt , and installed capital stock at time (t−1), K ijt−1 ). In the empirical investment literature it is well-known that, due the presence of nonconvexities in the adjustment costs function, investment is quite lumpy and volatile over time (Doms and Dunne, 1998) . It follows that the distribution of g k ijt (both cross-sectional and within firm) is characterized by some huge numbers and very frequent low values. We cope with this in two steps: in all regressions, we do not include observations with an investment-capital ratio larger than one (i.e. all the cases in which a firm more than doubled its production capacity); in the robustness section, we deal with the issue of a very large number of "almost zero" investment rates.
The coefficient of interest β 1 captures the correlation between the change in the log of the share of immigrants (coming from developing and emerging economies) over total population computed at the provincial level (∆ ln L imm jt P op jt ) and a firm's investment rate. We estimate this correlation conditional on a series of controls related to the demand and technological parameters entering equation (14), and to other factors, like adjustment costs, financial constraints, business cycle and unobservable provincial characteristics that are missing in the theoretical model but empirically relevant.
The most important control is the share of blue-collar workers ( L blue ijt L ijt ) that contributes to isolate the effect of immigration on investment from the one on the workforce's skill ratio that has been analyzed by Lewis (2004) , Card and Lewis (2005) and Dustmann and Glitz (2007) . 6 As to firm characteristics, we always add firm-level fixed effects (α i ) that control for a number unobservable factors like an entrepreneur's risk aversion or her ability to understand market dynamics. Among the firm-level time-varying controls, we include labor productivity (y ijt /L ijt ), log of employees (size), cash flow (cash f low), an indicator of investment reversibility (reversibility), a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm claims to be credit-rationed (credit rationing). We also include the rate of employment growth (employment growth) at the firm-level so that the effect of immigration on investment implies indeed a change in the capital intensity. Country-level common shocks are captured by year fixed effect (α t ), time-invariant local characteristics by provincial fixed effects (α j ). 7
To contain simultaneity problems, all explanatory variables are lagged one year.
Causality
Estimation of β 1 is potentially biased due to a correlation between ∆ ln L imm jt P op jt and the error term, even after controlling for fixed effects and other firm-level determinants of investment. This could be due to an omitted variable problem or to reverse causality. In the latter case, changes in firms' capital intensity across provinces could affect immigrants' location choice.
To address this concern we resort to an IV estimation, that, as in the previous literature, exploit the fact that immigrants tend to move in areas where other immigrants of the same nationality have settled before (Altonji and Card, 1991; Saiz, 2007) . In other words, we break the link between immigration flows by province and investment by instrumenting the former ones with the exogenous supply-push factors related to network effects.
In formulas, our provincial-level instrument is built in the following way:
where
is the predicted numbers of immigrants in province j at time t, L imm et is the total number of immigrants in Italy coming from country e at time t, δ je1992 = L imm je1992 /L imm e1992 is the share of country e nationals residing in region j in 1992. We sort the set of all countries of origin of immigrants to Italy according to their decreasing level of inflow in 1992, and let e range over the subset of the 20 countries that rank the highest. The inflows from these 20 countries represent almost the 80 per cent of the total inflow of migrants in 1992 (table 1). 8
The assumption that this prediction is independent of time-region-specific shocks driving current investment decision is based upon two reasonable considerations. First, the immigrant inflow in 1992 is not driven by omitted variables which are likely to affect investments in the future. This assumption is easily fulfilled since firms' investment decisions are forward looking and they do not suffer of any pile-up problem. Second, national inflows are not determined by the economic conditions of few provinces (i.e. each province is small compared to the national labor market). This is also likely to be satisfied: Italian provinces are 95 and the largest one in terms of share of immigrant population (Milan) did not exceed the 15 per cent of the total immigration in 1992.
Data
We base our analysis on the Survey on Investment in Manufacturing (SIM) dataset, an annual survey collected by the local branches of the Bank of Italy. We use only the subsample of manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees, which is continuosly available since 1984. 9 SIM is particularly rich and includes information on employment, sales, investments, export, ownership structure. Notes: "# of immigrants" is the flow of immigrants from each country of origin in 1992 from the dataset on Italian Residents; the country of origins included in the table are the top twenty by number of immigrants in 1992. "ranking 1" is the ranking of countries of origin according to decreasing "# of immigrants". "share" is the share of immigrants from each country of origin on total immigrants; it therefore doe not add to 100%, but it add to the share of immigrants from the top twenty contries of origin."Cumulative share" is the cumulate of the "share". "# of employees in mfg." is the number of employees in manufacturing from each country of origin in 2005, from the Labor Force Survey. "ranking 2" is the ranking of the twenty countries of origin according to decreasing "# of employees in mfg.". high quality and very detailed: they are separately available for machineries and equipment, ICT, land and buildings. Information on firms' employment structure is also detailed: there is a breakdown in terms of both number of workers and the share of blue and white collars. SIM does not provide figures on installed capital stock. For this we rely on the measure built by Bontempi et al. (2007) who matched SIM with the balance sheet figures available in the Company Account Data Service (CADS) dataset. We refer the reader to Bontempi et al. (2007) for a detailed description of the methodology for the computation of capital stock and investment deflator; for our purposes here, it is worth recalling that the total capital stock used to normalize machinery investment refers properly to machinery. The measure of investment reversibility is taken from Bianco et al. (2008) .
For our baseline exercise, this sample is an unbalanced panel with more than 8,000 observations over the period 1996-2007 on 2, 000 statistics for the pooled sample of firms are in Table 2 .
As expected, average size of our firms is quite large: given our median size equal to 168, our sample is representative of medium-large Italian firms. Not surprisingly the dynamics of employment is very low (0.9 percent increase on average). The investment rate for machinery is on average equal to 18 percent, the share of blue collars skims over 70 per cent, while the average increase in the share of immigrant population at provincial level is quite high (18 per cent), thus reflecting the large inflows of immigrants in the period considered.
The stock of migrants by country of origin and province of destination is taken by the annual permits released by the Italian Ministry of Interior. From population registers, instead, we get total population for each province. The distribution of the ratio between immigrants and total population across provinces for 1996 (initial year) is depicted in Figure 1 (panel a) . Clearly, the spatial distribution of foreign citizens is not uniform across provinces and it actually mirrors the unbalanced regional distribution of economic development in Italy: foreigners are concentrated in the wealthy and attractive regions of the Center and the North of the country. Despite more intense immigration flows, this pattern is confirmed in 2006 (Fig. 1,  panel b) .
Finally, in our regressions we drop all observation in 2004. This is due to the fact that a large amnesty was approved in 2002, which makes permits in 2003 -that enter our regressions in 2004 due to the one-year lag-not representative of the actual immigrants inflow of that period.
Results
We first estimate equation (16) by OLS.
In column (1) of Table 3 we start from a simple specification that includes only the change in the share of immigrants and the control for labor productivity and the share of blue-collar workers. Neither one of the three variables display a statistically significant coefficient. The coefficient of the immigration inflow at provincial level is also negative and very small. Things change when we enrich the model. Machinery investment rates decrease with the (log) level of employment (size) but increase its change (employment growth) (column (2)): while the former coefficient is saying that investment size is increasing and concave in firm size, the latter is simply saying that more workers have to be given more capital. Capital adjustment costs, proxied by the dummy reversibility, appear not be relevant. As shown in column (3), investment rates are larger in firms endowed more cash flow, thus reflecting a possible credit constraint issue.
In column (4) through (6) we show IV estimates. Now the coefficient of ∆ ln L imm jt P op jt is positive and significantly different from zero. It is also remarkably stable across the three specifications. The F-tests of the first stage are safely above the standard levels of the weak instruments literature (Bound et al., 1995) .
Heuristically, from the comparison of OLS and IV estimates, we infer that omitted variables or reverse causality induce a negative correlation between firms' investment rates and the change in the share of immigrants at the provincial-level. While the results on size, employment growth and cash flow are fully confirmed, it is interesting to notice that, until we include cash flow in column (6), labor productivity has a significantly positive impact on investment rates.
In line with the theoretical predictions, our estimates suggest that, other things being equal, firms respond to the inflow of migrants by increasing their capital-labor ratio. This is true after controlling for employment growth, so it is not the case that firms invest just to keep capital intensity unchanged if employment changes due to Table 3 : Machinery investment rate: baseline specification the availability of more immigrants. Our model-led intuition is that firms react to a dilution in the average quality of the labor force they have access to by increasing their capital stock. In the next section we try to make this intuition sounder, by controlling for some confounding factors.
Robustness
We now test the robustness of our results along three lines. The first one is linked to the empirical definition of technological expansion. As outlined in the previous section, due to non-convex adjustment costs, the distribution of investment rates might be characterized by a large number of very low values. This is indeed the case in our dataset (figure 2). An "almost zero" investment rate may suggest that a firm is not changing at all its the production capacity and therefore this figure cannot be correctly interpreted as a technological expansion, albeit small.
In order to account for this, we change the dependent variable and focus on the probability to make a large investment with the aim at capturing a true production capacity shift. We call an investment large when it exceeds half of the installed production capacity. By pooling all cross-sectional data, we estimates a probit Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Probit estimates. Dependent variable equal to one if the investment is lumpy (investment rate >0.5). All regressions include sector, provincial and year fixed effects. Residuals are clustered at firm level. Sector dummies are at 2 digits of Nace classification. and an IV-probit model. Since we cannot estimate a probit fixed effect model, we account for the possible autocorrelation in the error terms by clustering residuals at the firm-level. Results are displayed in Table 4 , where the first column reports the probit estimates and the second one the IV-probit estimates. As it occured in the base regression, the coefficient of ∆ ln L imm jt P op jt becomes positive and highly significant when we control for endogeneity. We therefore conclude that the probability to make a large investment increases the larger the immigrant inflow. The second test is linked to the immigrants' sectors of specialization. Up to now, To cope with this problem, in a robustness exercise we check whether the causal effect we are looking for comes, as it should, only from immigrants that are special- Table 5 .
The third check is linked to the Italian regional economic divide. The presence of an historical, huge North-South gap implies that, as depicted in Figure 1 , immigrants mostly concentrates in the Northern part of the country and they do so since the early migration inflows at the beginnings of the nineties. This implies that our instrument is likely to attribute most of migrations inflows to the most advanced part of the country. When regional Italian business cycles (and, therefore, investment decisions) happen to be systematically misaligned, the orthogonality condition of the instrument are violated.
( Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IV estimates with individual fixed effects. All regressions includes sector, provincial and year fixed effects. Sector dummies are at 2 digits of Nace classification. To cope with this, we perform various experiments. First, we re-estimate our base equation on a different, internally homogenous, group of regions, i.e. the Central and Northern regions. As shown in the first column of Table 6 , the concern is not relevant: exogenous immigration pressures have a positive impact on firms' investment rate also in the restricted sample of Center-Northern regions.
An alternative way to control for local business cycles is to add location*year dummies. Importantly, in the first stage of the IV estimation this helps to reestablish othogonality conditions. In the last three columns of the Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IV estimates with firm and year fixed effects. "area2" is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is located in the Center or Norther region. "area5" is a set of dummies variables that is equal to 1 if the firm is located in turn in North-West, North-East, Center, South, or Islands. 
Heterogeneous effects
The impact of immigration on capital intensity can be heterogeneous across sectors and firms. In this section we search for heterogeneous effects along three dimensions: the technological level, the firm size, and the amount of labor turnover each firm faces.
As to sectors, the idea we take to the data is that investment in labor intensive industries should react relatively more to changes in immigration to compensate the deterioration in the average skill level. We test this prediction by considering two possible definitions of technological level: ICT intensity, computed as the share of ICT capital stock over total capital (both in real terms) and R&D intensity, computed by the share of R&D expenditure over total value added. Both measures are computed for each 2-digit ISIC sector on US data. 11 In order to detect the differential effect across sectors, we insert in the baseline specification the interaction term ICT Table 7 , confirms the intuition: the impact of low-skilled immigration fades as long as the relative importance of technology rises. A second test looks at the variability of firms' reaction to immigration changes according to size. According to our simple theoretical model, size should not matter for the link between capital accumulation and immigration. However, this is due to the simplifying choice of excluding adjustment costs and credit market issues. In fact, since credit availability is highly heterogeneous across firms, we should expect a stronger impact of immigration on capital accumulation for the less-constrained larger firms. As before, we test this hypothesis and add as an additional regressor the interaction term between ∆ ln L imm jt P op jt and a dummy variable equal to one if a firm's employment level is larger than the median (150 employees; column (1)) or the 75-th percentile (200; column (1)). In both cases, our intuition is confirmed (Table 8 ).
The third test comes naturally out of the predictions of the theoretical model. This latter's crucial hypothesis is that firms and employees do not have long lasting relations. At each point in time a firm hires workers in the labor market extracting from the local distribution of workers she faces. This implies that firms experimenting an higher job turnover are more exposed to the deterioration of workers average quality induced by immigration flows, and therefore should be more prone to invest in capital stock. Table 9 shows the estimates of two different specifications taking this dimension of heterogeneity into account. In the first column the ∆ share of immigrants is interacted with a measure of turnover, that is the ratio between the number of employees hired at t − 1 plus the number of employees laid off at t − 1 and the stock of employees at t − 1. The interaction has a positive and significant coefficient, which confirms the theoretical prediction of the model. As a robustness check, in column two the ∆ share of immigrants is interacted with the growth rate of employment, which we consider here as a proxy of turnover (that is, firms whose employment grows more should face the labor market more often and suffer of labor force deterioration to a larger extent). Results are confirmed, but the estimate is less precise. 
Concluding remarks
The large inflow of immigrant workers has recently raised a number of concerns on how hosting countries' economies might react to the arrival of a high number of unskilled immigrants in their workforce. In this paper, we focus on the reaction of firms and their decision to invest in machinery. We first present a theoretical model which shows in a partial equilibrium monopolistic competition framework that, under some parameter restrictions, firms might couteract to the arrival of less productive workers by investing more in machineries. This effect is shown to be stronger in industries where the substitution between unskilled workers and capital is higher. We subsequently checked these predictions on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms on the period 1996-2007. In line with the theoretical predictions, Italian firms invested more in machineries if they happened to be located in areas which attracted more foreign citizens. This result is robust to endogeneity concerns, to the possible bias due to the lumpy nature of investment decisions, to the heterogeneity of immigrants specialization and to the Italian regional economic divide. Finally, this result is stronger low-tech industries, where higher is the substitutability between unskilled workers and capital, in the Center-North of the country and for large firms, which face smaller adjustment costs and credit market constraints, and for firms experimenting a larger job turnover, which are more exposed to the deterioration of the average workers' quality induced by the inflow of low skilled immigrants.
